The second part in the Euthyphro Dilemma.
This post is part of a series dealing with a moral question called the Euthyphro Dilemma. The questions were set up in Part 1. This continues the response.
Second, the critic might say something like “Good” is a property that we can apply independently of God. If I can conceive of the property of good, and apply it to things independently of God, then God is not necessary for the concept of good, and the euthyphro dilemma stands.
This second criticism is not valid. One key flaw is that it deals with conceiving of a property and mentally applying it. By its own admission it deals with the concept of good. It assumes that if we can conceive of a concept and predicate it mentally, existence must follow. This is a false conclusion. In reality, good has actual existence; things are good, or things are not good, in a very…
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